Blink DSH-Net
Total Defence Triad · Israel

The adversary no longer breaks in. He strikes the building, calls the person and floods the feed.

Blink DSH-Net builds the three layers that hold when he does.
Data that survives the loss of any site or provider — running.
Evidence that shows a campaign before anyone acts — built.
A phone that decides before fear does — built.
Nothing on this site is claimed without a run.

Built in Israel for defence, government and critical infrastructure · installed on your infrastructure, no outbound telemetry · every claim tagged running, built or planned — and dated.

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Gateway2 of 5providers lost, every byte returned — 3+2 across five providers; the sixth is a hot spare for automatic replacement. Proof
Gateway0 bytesreadable by a compromised gateway, a stolen provider account or a rogue user: 14 of 14 checks. Proof · Deleting is not covered
GatewayPQC by defaultX25519 + ML-KEM-768 key wrapping and RS256 + ML-DSA-44 token signatures in production, no classical fallback. Vectors
Gateway35 of 35files rebuilt from their raw fragments by the customer-held recovery tool, every byte checked against its hash — 7 of 7 daily runs; today the drill fetches the fragments through the gateway. Proof

The cost of inaction

Site

March 2026: drones struck two AWS data centres in the UAE, and a strike close to a Bahrain facility damaged its infrastructure (AWS status updates, reported by The Register); press reports attribute the strikes to Iran. On 4 April Tom’s Hardware reported that AWS had declared several zones “hard down”. On 15 September AWS said it cannot restore the resources and data hosted only in its Bahrain region and in one UAE zone.

Operator

October 2026: drones put modules of Yandex’s data centre in Kaluga out of action, then struck a VK data centre on 18 October; users of both lost services.

Key

2 November 2026: attackers reached the control plane of the hosting provider Beget and ran wiping scripts. Its cloud — VPS, S3, Kubernetes — was destroyed; VPS file backups survived for about half of the users. Beget notified its customers of force majeure.

Person

By 10 March 2026 Israel’s National Cyber Directorate had received over 1,300 reports of Iranian attempts to scare people or phish for their data with fake calls and text messages.

Multi-region inside one vendor is still one vendor.

Sources: The Register, 2 March 2026 · Tom’s Hardware, 4 April 2026 · The National, 15 September 2026 (AWS Health Dashboard) · Novaya Gazeta, 9 October 2026 · SecurityLab, 18 October 2026 · Xakep, 6 November 2026 · SecurityLab, November 2026 · The Jerusalem Post, 10 March 2026

Three fronts, one adversary

Every modern campaign against a state attacks on all three at once. Each front has a loss, a 2026 precedent and a layer that holds.

Front 1 · The state’s data

The building is the target

Strikes on data centres, wipers that erase disks and backups in one pass, stolen provider keys that delete a whole bucket, sanctions and seizures. “Multi-region” inside one operator is one owner, one key ring, one legal address.

What is lost: registries, case files, pensions, health records — gone with the building, while the operator disclaims liability.

March 2026: strikes hit AWS data centres in the UAE and damaged one in Bahrain; on 15 September AWS said it cannot restore the data hosted only in its Bahrain region and in one UAE zone (AWS Health Dashboard). October 2026: drones put modules of Yandex’s data centre in Kaluga out of action, then struck a VK data centre (Novaya Gazeta, SecurityLab).

Blink Gateway — Autonomous Cyber Resilience Layer, storage that heals itself and replaces a failing provider without a person: fragments 3+2 across five providers in accounts you own, the sixth a hot spare for automatic replacement — any two can vanish; the server holds your keys only in wrapped form; recovery without the vendor.

How it works and where it stands →

Front 2 · The information space

The crowd is now software

Persona networks, AI agents running thousands of accounts, mirror news domains, fake emergency alerts, crisis and election spoofing — faster than any post-mortem.

What is lost: a decision an election body or a ministry must defend before a comptroller, a court and allies — with a vendor’s score nobody can check.

July 2026: according to INSS’s account of the report, Israel’s State Comptroller found significant deficiencies in the country’s preparedness against foreign interference in the digital sphere — no comprehensive national policy, gaps in coordination (INSS, 13 July 2026). September 2026: an OSINT investigation documented an operational core of 35 accounts in the election debate — 32 Israeli-presenting personas and three Hebrew media-style channels — assessed by its authors as most consistent with an operation associated with the Islamic Republic of Iran; 947,322 impressions in 30 days (Golden Owl, 24 September 2026).

Blink Cognitive ISR — Cognitive Defense Line, the layer that defends the information space rather than networks or buildings: sealed collection, preregistered null models, proof bundles an offline verifier replays; the machine assembles the evidence, a person signs.

How it works and where it stands →

Front 3 · The citizen and the employee

The phone rings at 2 a.m.

A text that knows your ID number, a “grandson” with a cloned voice, a “bank officer” asking for the code, CEO fraud on a staff phone. Carrier filters see one channel; caller-ID apps learn after the first victims.

What is lost: a lifetime of savings in one call; the family finds out afterwards.

By 10 March 2026 Israel’s National Cyber Directorate had received over 1,300 reports of Iranian attempts using fake calls and text messages (The Jerusalem Post).

Shomer — Autonomous Phone and SMS Fraud Defence: a decision on the device, by profile — child, elderly, employee; the guardian learns the fact, never the text.

How it works and where it stands →

Three products, one triad

Status as of 13 November 2026; Blink Cognitive ISR as of 5 November 2026. Three states only: running (in a live deployment), built (exists and is tested, not yet deployed or measured where it matters), planned.

Blink Gateway

Autonomous Cyber Resilience Layer

Vendor-blind sovereign storage that survives the loss of any site or provider.

  • RunningSelf-penetration test 2.1–2.8 (November 2026): 3 high, 6 medium, 3 low — twelve findings fixed, two boundaries disclosed; all twelve fixes in production as of 5 November; one boundary closed by read-back verification of new fragments at the provider, one accepted and listed; request-body limits on every route, name-bound audit events and canary reconciliation proven in production with red runs and controls.
  • RunningReference deployment over six independent providers: 3+2 across five, the sixth a hot spare for automatic replacement; two-provider loss survived byte for byte; self-healing and restore drills signed into a hash chain; automatic provider replacement proven on the test stand, 12 of 12 — no replacement has happened in production yet.
  • RunningHybrid post-quantum key wrapping (X25519 + ML-KEM-768) and token signatures (RS256 + ML-DSA-44) as the only path; self-hosted install package for arm64 and x86-64 with folders, versions, sharing and 16 MiB chunks on web, desktop and Android.
  • BuiltKeys without delete rights — proven on the test stand, switched on before the first customer data; adaptive erasure coding across 3–8 providers.
  • PlannedObject Lock — decided, switched on before the first customer data; multi-site control plane (Raft), measured recovery time on a clean host, independent penetration test, SOC 2 / FIPS 140-3, enterprise SSO, first production pilots.
  • TRL 7Running in an operational environment on six providers with weekly proofs; not 8 until an external qualification and a customer pilot.

How it works and where it stands →

Blink Cognitive ISR

Cognitive Defense Line

Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance for the information environment, with replayable evidence.

  • RunningSealed collection and nightly processing of public channels; detector calibration on pre-registered protocols.
  • BuiltEvent-locked surge detector awaiting its first holdout result; duplicate-synchrony and origin-tracing instruments in descriptive mode.
  • PlannedSite-infrastructure tracing, post-quantum signatures on the evidence registry, self-building instruments.
  • TRL 4–5Components validated in the laboratory; the detector is not certified.

How it works and where it stands →

Shomer

Autonomous Phone and SMS Fraud Defence

Autonomous phone and SMS fraud defence for Android: the decision is made on the device; the user acts in the thirty seconds after the phone rings. Built — proven on the emulator and on two devices; not in production.

  • BuiltOn-device link classifier (brand mismatch, look-alikes, punycode, IP hosts, open redirects, shorteners with urgency words in three languages); 100% branch coverage; zero packets leave the phone during a decision.
  • BuiltCall filter with family reputation, wave detection and a risk window; five profiles and two interfaces; family circle on device certificates with end-to-end encrypted chat; call-request validation. Current build 1.5.7 (8 November 2026); the last full gate run on record is build 1.5.3 (7 November 2026): unit tests, branch-coverage gates, lint and static analysis all pass; gate log available on request.
  • BuiltSOS — two-second hold measured by the clock, three-second countdown, alert to the circle before a position exists, SMS fallback — proven on two consumer phones (Samsung, Xiaomi) on 5 November, build 1.4.8. Eleven own defects found, fixed and published on 4–5 November.
  • PlannedThe rest of the real-phone checklist with a published device log, call audio through the relay, backend on Israeli hosting, joining by phone number, QR check, one-tap report, Google Play listing, first family and municipal pilots, WhatsApp and RCS coverage, iOS guardian app.
  • TRL 4A prototype proven on the emulator and on two devices.

How it works and where it stands →

Why you don’t have to take our word for it

Every claim on this site is tagged running, built or planned and dated. The flagship ones are listed on Proofs with the test that would fail if they were false, its commit and the date of the run; for the rest an evidence record available on request. What is not proven is listed, not hidden.

Sovereign by constructionYour host, your providers, your jurisdictions. The vendor operates nothing and holds nothing.
Mathematics over trustErasure coding, client-side encryption and post-quantum wrapping instead of contractual promises.
Deterministic decisions, a human makes the final callRules you can read and replay; one alert to a person, not a task.
Memory-safe core, local modelsA Rust core and open-weight models that run where the data is.
Survives the vendorIf Blink DSH-Net ceased to exist tomorrow, your files could still be rebuilt from their raw fragments with a recovery tool you hold — no gateway software, no vendor. A daily drill rebuilds a random sample with that tool and checks every byte against its hash (proof); today the drill fetches the fragments through the gateway, and decryption uses your own keys, as always.
Evidence, not slidesEvery flagship claim is on Proofs with its test, commit and run; the rest have an evidence record available on request; nothing is published before a run proves it, and what is not proven is listed.

Who it is for

Defence primesQualifiable, air-gap-ready components licensed under your brand; a self-hosted package with pinned images and an SBOM per image.
Government and intelligenceSTIX 2.1 events from the information environment; a store no provider can read; a population that cannot be panicked by a mass text.
Critical infrastructure and data-centre operatorsStorage that survives two simultaneous provider losses — or the loss of a site by force; early warning of coordinated pressure.
Families, municipalities, banks and telecomsShomer on the phones of children, the elderly and staff; the brand protected on every Shomer phone; nothing uploaded.

Standards we align to

Alignment is a design choice; certification is held only where stated — today, nowhere.

AreaStandardStatus
CryptographyHybrid X25519 + ML-KEM-768 key wrapping; RS256 + ML-DSA-44 signatures (NIST FIPS 203 / 204); AES-256-GCM; ECDSA P-256 device certificates (Shomer)Running (Gateway); built (Shomer)
AuthenticationFIDO2 / WebAuthn passkeys, TOTPRunning
Threat and evidence formatsSTIX 2.1, DISARM, EEAS FIMI taxonomy, MITRE ATT&CKRunning (ISR)
AssuranceSOC 2, FIPS 140-3, independent penetration test, signatures on the ISR evidence registryPlanned — not held, not claimed

Talk to us

Access is provisioned one to one after a technical conversation. Write to us, or copy the address if your phone has no mail client: contact@blink-dsh.net

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