Blink DSH-Net Israel

Proofs

A claim is listed here only with the test that would fail if the claim were false, the commit the test ran on, and the date of the run. Each row is taken from an internal evidence record, available on request.

Claim → test → commit → run

  • Two providers lost, byte for byte: after one provider's fragments are rebuilt, two more are stopped and every file still downloads with its original SHA-256 — 60 of 60 files in 9 of 9 runs.Test: stand/b2/run.sh (KILL2=1) · commit 3169e1e · run 2026-11-07 · evidence record available on request
  • Three compromises, by run: a hostile gateway, a stolen provider account and a rogue client each see, delete and fail to read exactly what the table says — 14 of 14 checks.Test: tests/e1/r2-compromise.sh · commit 294e8a6 · run 2026-10-31 · evidence record available on request
  • Wall detection against nine evasion scenarios: 6 of 9 missed before the new rules, 2 of 9 after, both remaining misses accepted boundaries.Test: tests/e1/r1-wall-adversarial.sh · commit 2a0e776 · run 2026-10-31 · evidence record available on request
  • ML-KEM-768 as the gateway uses it (ml-kem 0.3.2): 655 of 655 NIST ACVP and Wycheproof vectors; a mutant with broken implicit rejection is caught 5 of 5.Test: ACVP 80 + Wycheproof 575, harness outside the repo · commit 8d1c671 · run 2026-11-02 · evidence record available on request
  • ML-DSA-44 on the gateway's verify path (ml-dsa 0.1.1): 210 of 210 Wycheproof and ACVP vectors, no forgery accepted; the older 0.0.4 accepts one.Test: Wycheproof verify + ACVP sigVer, harness outside the repo · commit d9c2282 · run 2026-11-02 · evidence record available on request
  • A gateway cannot slip in a data-key wrap of its own: the v2 wrap holds on every leg, and the planted defect (salt without the seed) is caught.Test: frontend/tools/prove-h13-datakey-wrap.mjs --expect=fixed · commit 8c5e90b · run 2026-11-02 · evidence record available on request
  • Old-format key sets are refused (phase 3): with the flag off a rollback forgery opens, with it on the forgery is refused.Test: prove-phase3.mjs (7/7, red leg P1) · commit 7229767 · run 2026-11-03 · evidence record available on request
  • A server swapping a shared file's header does not obtain the key of a file the owner never shared; with the check removed it does (red leg).Test: frontend/tools/prove-h11-header.mjs, RED=1 · commit 6627df6 · run 2026-11-01 · evidence record available on request
  • One user cannot delete another user's file by restoring a manifest that names it: refused at restore.Test: stand, image fix2 (self-pentest P22-1) · commit 0fe5675 · run 2026-11-05 · evidence record available on request
  • An anonymous 300 MiB request is refused before it is read: 413 in about 85 ms, gateway memory flat.Test: anonymous POST 300 MiB on the live :8443 /api/v1/keys and /login · commit 44c4ea5 · run 2026-11-05 · evidence record available on request
  • The application's CSP header no longer allows inline script; the old config fails the same test.Test: tests/e1/prove-app-csp.sh · commit e4d6a73 · run 2026-11-05 · evidence record available on request
  • The folder tree and previews travel in the sealed registry snapshot without their owner; the test fails when the owner is not stripped.Test: cargo test --release snapshot (red leg) · commit b3a4aa4 · run 2026-11-01 · evidence record available on request
  • Broker ML-DSA signatures through OpenSSL: a signature by another seed and a one-character change are refused by both implementations and by the gateway.Test: tests/e1/prove-h9-mldsa.sh (legs 4–5) · commit df2671c · run 2026-11-01 · evidence record available on request
  • A package that leaves a production setting to the code's default is refused: compose 0.5.3 gives exactly the three missing settings.Test: tests/gates/check-package-env-parity.mjs · commit c6e3b05 · run 2026-11-07 · evidence record available on request
  • The limits list is generated from the own-defect register: a register row changed without the text makes the gate fail.Test: tests/gates/check-section6-register.mjs · commit fd96c49 · run 2026-11-07 · evidence record available on request
  • Files are rebuilt without the gateway's software: every day a random sample of stored files is rebuilt by the customer-held recovery tool from its raw fragments and each byte is checked against the file's hash — 35 of 35 files in 7 of 7 daily runs, each run signed. The drill still fetches the fragments through the gateway; the tool returns ciphertext, decrypted with the customer's own keys.Test: ops/restore-drill.sh (dsh-restore-drill timer, daily) · commit 06747d2 · run 2026-11-08 · evidence record available on request

16 claims. What the system does not promise is listed with the same discipline in the package's DISCLOSURES.md.