Blink DSH-Net

Blink DSH-Net · All products

Autonomous Cyber Resilience Layer · Israel

Blink Gateway

Vendor-blind sovereign storage that survives the loss of any site or provider — an autonomous cyber resilience layer: it heals lost redundancy and replaces a failing provider without a person.

What it does

  • Encrypts every file on the client (AES-256-GCM); the gateway routes ciphertext and never sees plaintext, file names, folders or previews.
  • Erasure-codes each file 3+2 and places one fragment per independent provider in accounts you own; any three fragments rebuild the file; writes below the declared level are refused.
  • Hybrid post-quantum key wrapping (X25519 + ML-KEM-768) and token signatures (RS256 + ML-DSA-44) as the only path.
  • Self-heals lost redundancy; quarantines a degraded provider and rebuilds onto a spare within an egress budget; restore drills signed into a hash chain.
  • Survives the vendor: if Blink DSH-Net ceased to exist tomorrow, your files could still be rebuilt from their raw fragments with a recovery tool you hold — no gateway software, no vendor; a daily drill rebuilds a random sample with that tool and checks every byte against its hash (proof); today the drill fetches the fragments through the gateway, and decryption uses your own keys.
  • One self-hosted package for arm64 and x86-64; folders, versions, sharing, 16 MiB chunks on web, desktop and Android.

Where it stands

Status as of 13 November 2026. Three states only: running (in a live deployment), built (exists and is tested, not yet deployed or measured where it matters), planned.

  • RunningSelf-penetration test 2.1–2.8 (November 2026): 3 high, 6 medium, 3 low — twelve findings fixed, two boundaries disclosed; all twelve fixes in production as of 5 November; one boundary closed by read-back verification of new fragments at the provider, one accepted and listed; request-body limits on every route, name-bound audit events and canary reconciliation proven in production with red runs and controls.
  • RunningReference deployment over six independent providers: 3+2 across five, the sixth a hot spare for automatic replacement; two-provider loss survived byte for byte (proof); self-healing and restore drills signed into a hash chain; automatic provider replacement proven on the test stand, 12 of 12 — no replacement has happened in production yet.
  • RunningHybrid post-quantum key wrapping (X25519 + ML-KEM-768) and token signatures (RS256 + ML-DSA-44) as the only path; self-hosted install package for arm64 and x86-64 with folders, versions, sharing and 16 MiB chunks on web, desktop and Android.
  • BuiltKeys without delete rights — proven on the test stand, switched on before the first customer data; adaptive erasure coding across 3–8 providers.
  • PlannedObject Lock — decided, switched on before the first customer data; multi-site control plane (Raft), measured recovery time on a clean host, independent penetration test, SOC 2 / FIPS 140-3, enterprise SSO, first production pilots.
  • TRL 7Running in an operational environment on six providers with weekly proofs; not 8 until an external qualification and a customer pilot.

Not claimed until a run proves it

  • Recovery time on a clean host — being measured; no RTO quoted until then.
  • High availability — the reference control plane is single-instance; the multi-site control plane (Raft) is planned.
  • Ransomware resistance — keys without delete rights are proven on the test stand, Object Lock is decided; both are switched on before the first customer data.
  • Protection against deletion by a captured gateway — while the provider keys still carry delete rights, whoever captures the gateway host can destroy the stored data; the figure for a compromised gateway counts what it can read, not what it can delete.
  • Protection of the registry files against offline guessing — whoever holds a copy of the registry files gets the wrapped key sets and can guess the password offline, outside the limits on login attempts; a password change does not remove earlier wrapped copies from those files.
  • Independent penetration test — planned, not held; the self-test is published with every finding and its fix.
  • SOC 2, FIPS 140-3 — not held, not claimed.

Who it is for

Defence primes, government, critical infrastructure and data-centre operators whose data must survive a strike, a sanction or a seizure — on their host, with their providers, in their jurisdictions.

Talk to us

Access is provisioned one to one after a technical conversation. Write to us, or copy the address if your phone has no mail client: contact@blink-dsh.net

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