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Autonomous Phone and SMS Fraud Defence · Israel

Shomer

Autonomous phone and SMS fraud defence for Android: the decision is made on the device; the user acts in the thirty seconds after the phone rings. Built — proven on the emulator and on two devices; not in production.

What it does

  • Decides offline when an unknown number calls or a text with a link arrives: allow, warn or block.
  • Five audience profiles — child, teenager, adult, elderly, employee — one engine, a different decision table each; a simple mode with large type and two buttons.
  • Link filter without SMS permission: reads the notification, normalises the link (punycode, user-info tricks, public-suffix aware) and classifies brand mismatch, look-alikes, IP hosts, open redirects and shorteners with urgency words in three languages.
  • Call filter with family reputation, wave detection and a risk window; a call request lets a stranger send a name, a reason and a time window first.
  • Family circle on device certificates (ECDSA P-256) with end-to-end encrypted chat; the guardian learns the fact and the domain, never the text; contacts are never uploaded.
  • Russian, Hebrew and English as first-class languages; Israel first.

Where it stands

Status as of 13 November 2026. Three states only: running (in a live deployment), built (exists and is tested, not yet deployed or measured where it matters), planned.

  • BuiltOn-device link classifier (brand mismatch, look-alikes, punycode, IP hosts, open redirects, shorteners with urgency words in three languages); 100% branch coverage; zero packets leave the phone during a decision.
  • BuiltCall filter with family reputation, wave detection and a risk window; five profiles and two interfaces; family circle on device certificates with end-to-end encrypted chat; call-request validation. Current build 1.5.7 (8 November 2026); the last full gate run on record is build 1.5.3 (7 November 2026): unit tests, branch-coverage gates, lint and static analysis all pass; gate log available on request.
  • BuiltSOS — two-second hold measured by the clock, three-second countdown, alert to the circle before a position exists, SMS fallback — proven on two consumer phones (Samsung, Xiaomi) on 5 November, build 1.4.8. Eleven own defects found, fixed and published on 4–5 November.
  • PlannedThe rest of the real-phone checklist with a published device log, call audio through the relay, backend on Israeli hosting, joining by phone number, QR check, one-tap report, Google Play listing, first family and municipal pilots, WhatsApp and RCS coverage, iOS guardian app.
  • TRL 4A prototype proven on the emulator and on two devices.

Not claimed until a run proves it

  • Real phones — proven so far: the SOS hold timing and its SMS fallback (two phones, 5 November). Not yet: the phishing-SMS alert to the guardian, the location dialog, GPS cold start, and every row still marked “emulator”.
  • Speech — in builds up to 1.4.8, the build proven on the phones, the “tell me what they said” button used the system recogniser, which may transcribe on a vendor server; until a build with on-device recognition is proven on the phones, “no audio leaves the phone” is not claimed.
  • Call audio through the relay — signalling works, audio is not yet heard; “calls work” is not claimed.
  • Deleting the SMS itself — only the default SMS app can; “blocked” means the fake notification is removed, a warning shown, the guardian alerted.
  • WhatsApp and RCS coverage, iOS guardian app, certifications — roadmap, not claims.

Who it is for

Families with children or elderly relatives; municipalities and welfare bodies; businesses whose staff phones are the breach; banks, the post and telecoms whose brands are the bait.

Talk to us

Access is provisioned one to one after a technical conversation. Write to us, or copy the address if your phone has no mail client: contact@blink-dsh.net

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